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Abstract 
In this paper we study the effect of quality of institutions in the OECD and Asian host 
countries on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks of source OECD 
countries using International Country Risk Guide governance indicators, for the 
period 1991 to 2001. We find that better institutions in the host countries have an 
overall positive and significant effect on source countries outward FDI stocks. The 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, popular observance of law, strength and 
quality of bureaucracy and government stability in host countries’ have direct effect 
on  source countries outward FDI stocks. Interestingly, trade changes sign and losses 
significance in two stage least squares regressions compared to theoretical 
expectation. Furthermore skill proxied by labour abundance in source countries 
relative to host countries appears to be insignificant in determining source countries’ 
outward FDI stock.      
 
 
 
Complete citation: 
Mishra, Anil & Daly, Kevin, 2007, ‘Effect of quality of institutions on outward foreign direct 
Investment’, The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 16:2, 231- 244 
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/09638190701325573 
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638190701325573
This is the authors’ corrected pre-publication version of the paper. Accessed from USQ 
ePrints http://eprints.usq.edu.au 
 
 
JEL Classification: F23, F3 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Governance Indicators, Institutions 
 
*Contact Information: Anil Mishra; Tel.: +61 2 04037 64431; E-mail: 
mishra@usq.edu.au. School of Accounting, Finance & Economics, University of 
Southern Queensland, QLD 4350, Australia 
 
 
**Contact Information: Kevin Daly; Tel: +61 2 04040 15192 E-mail: 
k.daly@uws.edu.au. School of Economics & Finance, University of Western Sydney, 
Locked Bag 1797, Penrith South DC, NSW 1797, Australia 
 2   
EFFECT OF QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS ON OUTWARD FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
Direct foreign investment (FDI) has risen much faster than world income and trade 
since the mid 1970s (Markusen and Venables, (1998); Markusen (1997, 2001)).  
Worldwide FDI flows have grown by a factor of ten compared to a doubling in trade 
flows over the period from 1980 to 1990 (Stein, E. and C. Daude, 2002). Outward 
direct investment from OECD countries has increased by approximately 193%, over 
the period 1991 to 2001.  
 
Since the late 1990s, a growing interest has emerged in studying the links between 
institutions and FDI. Good institutions are supposed to exert a positive influence on 
development through the promotion of investment in general. FDI is a very large part 
of capital formation in developing countries (UNCTAD, 2004), it remains an 
interesting question therefore to examine the role of good institutions in promoting 
FDI. 
 
The quality of institutions may matter in attracting FDI because good governance 
infrastructure is seen to play a pivotal role (e.g. higher productivity) in attracting 
foreign investment. On the other hand, poorly regulated institutions or a complete lack 
of institutional governance have a reputation for incurring additional costs when 
investing in overseas countries; corruption (Wei, 2000). Given the high sunk costs 
associated with investing offshore along with the uncertainty associated with poor 
physical and financial infrastructure along with weak enforcement of regulations and 
ineffective legal systems has progressively forced companies to be increasingly 
selective as to where they will invest.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess empirically the effect of host countries’ 
institutions on source countries’ stocks of outward foreign direct investment. The 
paper also empirically examines the influence of host countries’ institutions on source 
countries’ outward foreign direct investment upon introducing trade and skill 
variables. 
 
We find that host countries’ institutions are significant in explaining the source 
countries’ stocks of outward foreign direct investment. The host countries’ institutions 
remain significant upon introducing trade and skill variables.  
 
The rest of the paper follows as under: Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3 describes the data and relevant sources. Section 4 describes the empirical 
specification. Section 5 furnishes the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Several studies have focused on the role of institutions in locating FDI, for example 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) find that a composite index of risk factors, which include 
bureaucratic red tape, political instability, corruption and quality of the legal system, 
has no significant influence in determining the location of US foreign affiliates. 
However a composite index lumps together several institutional variables with other 
variables such as risk of terrorism, living environment of expatriates, inequality etc, 
which are not directly related to the quality of institutions. Wei (1997, 2000) uses data 
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on bilateral FDI stocks from OECD countries and finds that corruption, as well as 
uncertainty regarding corruption, has a significant negative effect on FDI. Globerman 
and Shapiro (1999) argue that good institutions may have a positive impact on FDI 
outflows because they create favourable conditions for multinational companies to 
emerge and invest abroad. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) estimate the impact of 
governance indicators developed by Kaufman et al. (1999) on both inflows and 
outflows of FDI. They find that good governance impacts positively both on FDI 
inflows and outflows, although the latter effect is only significant for relatively big 
and developed countries. One major limitation of these studies is that the empirical 
results do not incorporate bilateral parameters where for example institutional quality 
variables in both the source country and the host country are not included 
simultaneously. Thus it is not possible to rank the importance of governance in the 
source country compared to that of the host country.  
 
Stein, E. and C. Daude (2002) find inward FDI to be significantly influenced by the 
quality of institutional variables. They find that political instability and violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft matter for FDI. 
However political representation and accountability indicators have an insignificant 
affect on inward FDI. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and La Porta et 
al. (1998) variables such as risk of repudiation of contracts by government, and risk of 
the expropriation and shareholders rights are important variables when considering 
where to invest. Hausmann and Fernandez Arias (2000) use the Kaufmann et al 
(1999) data on institutional variables and indices of creditor and shareholder rights 
from La Porta et al (1997, 1998a, 1998b) to study the effects on the composition of 
capital inflows. They find that foreign portfolio investment is more sensitive to the 
quality of institutions, that regulatory burden, and government effectiveness and 
shareholders rights have significant effects on FDI as a share of GDP. Mody et al 
(2003) finds that the proportion of FDI in comparison to portfolio investment is lower 
in countries where institutions are more transparent. They present empirical evidence 
based on an index of creditor’s rights from La Porta et al (2000) in their gravity model 
to explain the ratio of FDI flows to trade. Aizman and Spiegel (2002) find that the 
share of FDI to gross fixed investment as well as the ratio of FDI to private domestic 
investment is negatively and significantly correlated with the level of corruption and 
FDI is more sensitive than domestic investment to the level of institutional quality. In 
a set of cross country regressions with the average FDI shares in gross private capital 
flows as dependent variable and controlling by GDP per capita and trade openness, 
Albuquerque (2003) finds that the ICRG variable Law and Order has a negative and 
insignificant effect. One limitation of these studies is that they focus on FDI as a share 
of capital flows. These studies test the models controlling for other possible 
determinants of FDI as GDP per capita, openness, size etc and rely on ad-hoc 
empirical specifications. This paper focuses on FDI per se, rather than on the 
composition of capital inflows. The paper focuses on the quality and types of 
institutional governance that may affect foreign investors to undertake investment 
projects in a particular country. 
 
There is a separate class of papers that examines the effects of institutional quality on 
per capita incomes which include Dollar and Kraay (2002), Easterly and Levine 
(2002), Alcala and Ciccone (2002) and Rodrik et al (2002). Rodrick et al (2002) 
estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in 
determining income levels around the world, using instruments for institutions and 
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trade. Their results indicate that the once institutions are controlled for, measures of 
geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong 
indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions 
are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income 
equation with the wrong (i.e. negative) sign, although trade too has a positive effect 
on institutional quality. Dollar and Kraay (2002) investigate the partial effects of 
institutions and trade on growth. They argue that cross-country regressions of the log-
level of per capita GDP on instrumented measures of trade and institutional quality 
are uninformative about the relative importance of trade and institutions in the long 
run, because of the very high correlation between the latter changes in trade and 
changes in institutional quality provide evidence of significant effect of trade on 
growth, with a smaller role for improvements in institutions. These results are 
suggestive of an important joint role for both trade and institutions in the very long 
run, but a relatively larger role for trade over shorter horizons. Our paper examines 
the effects of host countries’ institutional quality on source countries’ outward foreign 
direct investment. 
 
Moenius and Berkowitz (2004) argue that the quality of institutions that enforce 
contracts and protect property rights influences the costs of producing high-value 
added (complex) versus low-value added (simple) products. They find that 
improvements in institutional quality increase the share and volume of a country’s 
complex product exports. Our paper does not distinguish between the complex and 
simple products.  
 
 
3.  Data 
(i) FDI Data 
We use data on bilateral outward FDI stocks from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics in millions of US dollars for the period from 1991 to 2001. Our 
paper takes into account bilateral outward FDI stocks of OECD source countries viz.  
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States and host countries namely Australia, Canada, 
China, Chinese Taipei, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
and United States. We use stocks rather than flows as our main dependent variable 
because they are able to capture the characteristics of host countries that may have an 
effect on the total amount of exposure that a firm in a source country may want to 
have in them. Firms adjust to this exposure, upwards or downwards, according to their 
business strategies and changes in the relative attractiveness of different locations. In 
addition, by using the stock data, it is ensured that the differences across countries in 
the definition and measurement of FDI do not alter the relative allocation of FDI for 
each of the source countries. Wei (1997, 2000) employs the bilateral outward FDI 
stocks database to study the effect of corruption on FDI. Blonigen et al (2002) use the 
stock data to empirically test different theories of FDI and Levy Yeyati et al (2003) 
use this data to analyse the relationship between FDI and regional integration. 
 
(ii) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Variables 
The ICRG model forecasts financial, economic and political risk. We use 
International Country Risk Guide model related to political risk. The political risk 
comprises of 12 components; of which we employ four components viz. Law and 
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Order, Government Stability, Bureaucratic Quality and Corruption. Each component 
is assigned a maximum numerical value (risk points), with the highest number of 
points indicating the lowest potential risk for that component and the lowest number 
(0) indicating the highest potential risk.  
 
ICRG assigns a maximum value of 6 points to Law and Order component constituting 
of two sub components. Each sub component equals half of the total. The “law” sub 
component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the “order” 
sub component assesses popular observance of law.   
 
ICRG assigns a maximum value of 12 points to Government Stability measure. 
Government Stability is a measure of the government’s ability to stay in office and 
carry out its declared program(s), depending upon such factors as the type of 
governance, cohesion of the government and governing parties, approach of an 
election, and command of the legislature. 
 
ICRG assigns a maximum value of 4 points to Bureaucracy Quality measure. 
Bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure in low-risk countries. 
Bureaucracy Quality measures the institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy 
that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. 
 
ICRG assigns a maximum value of 6 points to Corruption measure. Corruption is a 
threat to foreign investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, 
reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume 
positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent 
instability into the political process. 
 
(iii)  jTRADE
jTRADE  is the ratio of sum of host country’s exports and imports to host country’s 
GDP. We have used trade share rather than average tariff rates. If one uses averages 
of tariff rates, it is possible to give inordinate weight to categories of goods that are 
relatively unimportant for a country. Further, there is almost no relationship between 
reductions in reported average tariff rates and changes in trade volumes. For instance, 
India had large reported declines in tariffs and large increases in trade over past two 
decades. On the other hand, countries like Pakistan and Kenya had significant 
reported tariff declines and decreases in trade. China and Mexico had huge increases 
in trade but only moderate reported tariff reductions. We rely on trade as a fraction of 
GDP as our measure of  in panel regression and expect its coefficient to have 
positive sign. 
jTRADE
 
(iv) Instrumental Variables ( )jINS  
There may be possibility that the quality of institutions might be endogenous for two 
reasons. There could be a feedback effect on the quality of institutions, once the 
foreign investors located in host economies become part of the system that demands 
better institutions. There may also be subjectivity bias or measurement error in the 
quality of institutional indicators, leading to errors in econometric results.  
 
In order to address these possible endogeneity problems, we estimate two stage least 
square results, by taking the instrumental variables that are standard in the literature. 
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We consider the index of religion, ethnicity and language from Alesina et al (2002). 
Their variable “language” is based on the data from Encyclopedia Britannica (2001), 
which reports the shares of languages spoken as “mother tongues”, generally based on 
national census data. Their data includes 1055 major linguistic groups for 201 
countries. Their religious fractionalization variable “religion” is based on the data 
from Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001) and covers 294 different religions in 215 
countries. The ethnic fractionalization variable “ethnicity” involves a combination of 
racial and linguistic characteristics. Their data is based on Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(2001), CIA (2000), Levinson (1998) and Minority Rights Group International (1997) 
and covers 650 distinct ethnic groups in 190 countries.  
 
We also use Acemoglu et al. (2001) mortality rates of colonial settlers as an 
instrument for institutional quality. They state that European colonizers erected solid 
institutions that protected property rights and established the rule of law, only at those 
locations where they encountered relatively few health hazards. In other areas, their 
interests were limited to extracting as much resources as quickly as possible, and they 
showed little interest in building high quality institutions. Acemoglu et al (2001) 
argue that since institutions change only gradually over time, therefore settler 
mortality rates are a good instrument for institutional quality. 
 
We use Frankel and Romer’s (1999) measure of predicted trade as an instrument for 
actual trade/GDP ratios. Frankel and Romer (1999) regress bilateral trade flows as a 
share of country’s GDP on measures of country mass, distance between the trade 
partners, and a few other geographical variables and then construct a predicted 
aggregate trade share for each country on the basis of coefficients estimated. They use 
this constructed trade share as an instrument for actual trade share in estimating the 
impact of trade on levels of income. 
 
(v) GDP  
GDP  is the sum of the logs of the host country and source country GDPs, in current 
US dollars; taken from World Development Indicators. Large market sizes are 
expected to attract FDI because of economies of scale in production and distribution 
for products sold in the host market; large markets may be associated with 
agglomeration economies that lower costs for all producers in that market and 
availability of highly specialized inputs that may not be found in smaller markets. We 
expect GDP  to have a positive sign.  
 
(vi)  ijDIS
  is the distance in kilometres between the capital cities of source and host 
countries; taken from 
ijDIS
www.indocom.au. The sign of this variable is ambiguous in 
theory, because distance is an element in both export costs and investment and 
monitoring costs. 
 
(vii)  SKILL
SKILL  is a measure of skill labor abundance in the parent country relative to the host 
country. Skilled labor endowment is the percentage of labor force with secondary 
education; taken from World Development Indicators. We expect this coefficient to 
be positive because firms tend to be headquartered in the skilled labor abundant 
country. A rise in skilled labor abundance differences tends to increase FDI from the 
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skilled country to the host country. This effect diminishes when the unskilled host is 
small. 
  
4.  Empirical Specification 
We use the following empirical specification: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ijjijij SKILLTRADEINSDISGDPFDI εχηλγβα ++++++=+ )(1log     (1) 
ijFDI  is the outward FDI stock of country in country i j .  is the sum of log of 
GDPs of countries i  and 
GDP
j .  is the distance in kilometers between the capital 
cities of countries i  and 
ijDIS
j .  is the measure of institution for country jINS j . 
 is the ratio of trade to GDP for country jTRADE j . is the absolute difference 
between countries’ endowments of skilled labor. 
SKILL
iε  is the random error term. 
 
The double log specification is chosen because it has typically shown the best 
adjustment to the data in the empirical trade literature using the gravity model. Our 
dataset includes some observations where FDI stocks are zero, which would be 
dropped by taking logs. Therefore, we use ( )1log +ijFDI  as our dependent variable to 
keep these zero observations. This specification to deal with the problem of the 
observations with a value of zero for the dependent variable has been used in gravity 
models of trade by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, 1997). 
 
We employ a two stage least squares estimation for addressing the problems 
associated with reserve causality, omitted variable bias and measurement error. The 
following equations represent the first stage regressions where  and  
are regressed on all exogenous variables. 
jINS jTRADE
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) INSjjjjjjj CTRADEMORLANETHNICRELIGIONINS ενωγφδμ ++++++=
           (2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) TRADEjjjjjjj CTRADEMORLANETHNICRELIGIONTRADE ετψυξσθ ++++++=
           (3) 
jRELIGION ,  and  are the indices of religion, ethnicity and language 
from Alesina et al (2002).  is the mortality rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
and  is the predicted trade share from Frankel and Romer (1999). 
jETHNIC jLAN
jMOR
jCTRADE
 
5. Empirical Results 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
We start with OLS regression of log(FDI+1) on sum of log components of GDPs of 
host and source countries (GDP); log of distance between host and source countries 
(DIS); and institutional variable i.e. Law & Order (LAW). GDP is positive and 
significant indicating that higher total income should lead to some shifting from 
national firms, which are high marginal cost suppliers to foreign markets (Markusen 
and Venables, 1998). DIS is negative and significant indicating that FDI may decrease 
in countries that are in remote locations. LAW is positive and highly significant with 
a coefficient of 0.52; indicating that 100 percent increase in strength and impartiality 
of legal system and observance of law leads to a 52 percent of increase in FDI stocks 
from source to host countries. In column (2), the instrumented regression with the 
religion and mortality variables as instruments, Law and Order remains highly 
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significant. In column (3), to examine the effect of trade on institution, we add Trade 
variable. GDP, DIS, LAW and Trade are all significant. LAW is positive and highly 
significant with a coefficient of 0.44. Column (4) performs two stage least squares 
test, by taking into account the instrumental variables for LAW and Trade. LAW 
remains highly significant with a coefficient increasing from 0.44 to 0.57. Trade 
changes sign and remain significant at 10 percent. In column (5), we add SKILL 
variable to determine the effect of absolute difference in skill level of host and source 
countries on LAW. SKILL variable appears to be negative and insignificant. LAW 
and Trade are both positive and highly significant. In Column (6) the instrumented 
regression with religion, ethnic, mortality and predicted trade share as the 
instruments; Law and Order and SKILL are highly significant. Trade looses 
significance and changes sign.          
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Table 2 employs Bureaucratic Quality (BQ) as the institutional variable. In column 
(1); GDP, DIS and BQ are all with their respective signs and highly significant. BQ is 
positive and highly significant with the coefficient of 0.72; indicating that a 100 
percent increase in institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy leads to an 
increase in the outward FDI stock of 72 percent from source to host countries. The 
instrumented regression in Column (2) indicates an increase in the coefficient of BQ 
from 0.72 to 0.89. To examine the effect of trade on institutional variable; we add 
Trade variable in column (3). BQ and Trade are both positive and highly significant. 
Column (4) performs instrumented regression with religion, ethnic and predicted trade 
share as instruments. The institutional variable, BQ remains positive and highly 
significant with a coefficient of 0.91. Trade changes sign and remain significant only 
at 5 percent. In column (5), we add SKILL variable to determine the effect of absolute 
difference in skill level of host and source countries on BQ. SKILL variable appears 
to be negative and insignificant. BQ and Trade are both positive and highly 
significant. In Column (6) the instrumented regression with religion, ethnic, mortality 
and predicted trade share as the instruments; BQ remains highly significant. Trade 
looses significance and changes sign.          
 [INSERT TABLE 3] 
Table 3 employs Government Stability (GS) as the institutional variable. In column 
(1); GDP, DIS and GS are all with their respective signs and highly significant. The 
instrumented regression in Column (2) indicates an increase in the coefficient of GS 
from 0.16 to 0.69; indicating that a 100 percent increase in government stability leads 
to an increase in the outward FDI stock of 69 percent from source to host countries. 
To examine the effect of trade on institutional variable; we add Trade variable in 
column (3). GS and Trade are both positive and highly significant. Column (4) 
performs instrumented regression with religion, ethnic and predicted trade share as 
instruments. Again, GS and Trade remain positive and significant. In column (5), we 
add SKILL variable to determine the effect of absolute difference in skill level of host 
and source countries on GS. SKILL variable appears to be negative and significant. 
GS and Trade are both positive and highly significant. In Column (6) the instrumented 
regression with religion, ethnic, mortality and predicted trade share as the 
instruments; GS and Trade remain positive and highly significant. SKILL changes 
sign and looses significance. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Table 4 employs Corruption (COR) as the institutional variable. ICRG assigns higher 
numerical values of COR to countries with low corruption and vice versa. In column 
(1); GDP, DIS and COR are all with their respective signs and highly significant. The 
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instrumented regression in Column (2) indicates an increase in the coefficient of COR 
from 0.30 to 0.56; indicating that host countries’ with low level of corruption attracts 
high level of foreign direct investment. To examine the effect of trade on institutional 
variable; we add Trade variable in column (3). COR and Trade are positive and highly 
significant. Column (4) performs instrumented regression with religion, ethnic and 
predicted trade share as instruments. COR and Trade remain highly significant. 
However, Trade changes sign and become negative.  In column (5), we add SKILL 
variable to determine the effect of absolute difference in skill level of host and source 
countries on COR. SKILL variable appears to be negative and significant. COR and 
Trade are both positive and highly significant. In Column (6) the instrumented 
regression with religion, ethnic, mortality and predicted trade share as the 
instruments; COR looses significance and becomes negative. Trade remains positive 
but looses significance. SKILL remains negative but looses significance. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Table 5 shows the first stage regressions corresponding to the IV regressions in 
Tables 1 to 4. In column (1), LAW is the dependent variable. Trshare and religion are 
highly significant and positive. The value of adjusted R2 is 0.46. Column (2) has BQ 
as the dependent variable. Religion is positive and highly significant. Trshare is 
negative and significant only at 10 percent. The value of adjusted R2 is 0.46. In 
column (3), GS is the dependent variable. Trshare, religion and mortality are all 
positive and significant. The value of adjusted R2 is 0.18. In column (4), COR is the 
dependent variable. Trshare appears to be positive and significant. The value of 
adjusted R2 is 0.49. In column (5), trade is the dependent variable. Trshare is positive 
and highly significant. Mortality and religion are both negative and significant. The 
value of adjusted R2 is 0.33. 
 
The correlation between fitted trade and fitted instrumental variables viz. Law and 
Order, Bureaucratic Quality, Government Stability and Corruption is -0.04, -0.05, -
0.58 and 0.22. The low levels of correlation between the fitted trade and instrument 
variables (Law and Order, Bureaucratic Quality) suggest that the regressions do not 
suffer from the problem of multi-collinearity. The level data on FDI stocks is 
informative about the separate roles of trade and institutions. 
 
6.      Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper assesses the effect of the quality of host countries’ institutional variables 
on the source OECD countries’ outward FDI stocks. The host countries’ sample 
includes both, OECD and Asian countries.   
 
We find that quality of host countries’ institutions have positive effects on source 
countries’ outward FDI stocks. Institutions remain positive and significant in two 
stage least squares regression. Trade changes sign and losses significance in two stage 
least squares regression. Skill labor abundance in host country relative to parent 
country appears to be ambiguous and insignificant.  
 
ICRG institutional variables viz. Law and Order, Bureaucratic Quality, Government 
Stability and Corruption appear to be positive and significant. Good political 
governance is characterized by policies promoting competition on both domestic and 
an international level; policies promoting open markets and effective and non-corrupt 
public institutions as well as by open and transparent legal and regulatory regimes, 
and effective delivery of government services.  
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TABLE 1: FDI regression considering Institution (Law & Order) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
GDP 0.32 
(58.81)* 
0.38 
(9.65)* 
0.34 
(61.36)* 
0.30 
(13.87)* 
0.34 
(51.00)* 
0.08 
(1.04) 
DIS -0.30 
(-17.69)* 
-0.85 
(-2.54)** 
-0.32 
(-19.44)* 
-0.21 
(-1.27) 
-0.33 
(-17.67)* 
-0.13 
(-0.40) 
LAW 0.52 
(24.63)* 
0.56 
(10.52)* 
0.44 
(20.05)* 
0.57 
(13.83)* 
0.45 
(18.01)* 
1.20 
(6.94)* 
Trade   0.24 
(13.08)* 
-0.09 
(-1.84)*** 
0.25 
(12.20)* 
-0.13 
(-1.30) 
SKILL     -0.00 
(-1.09) 
0.04 
(3.16)* 
Instrumental 
Variables 
 Religion 
Mor 
 
 Religion 
Mor 
Trshare 
 Religion 
Ethnic 
Mor 
Trshare 
Adj. R2 0.33  0.38  0.40  
Obs. 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 
 
 
TABLE 2: FDI regression considering Institution (Bureaucratic Quality) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
GDP 0.33 
(65.64)* 
0.35 
(10.12)* 
0.35 
(69.11)* 
0.22 
(5.54)* 
0.34 
(52.64)* 
-0.26 
(-0.81) 
DIS -0.30 
(-17.38)* 
-0.65 
(-2.16)** 
-0.32 
(-19.33)* 
0.43 
(1.52) 
-0.32 
(-17.55)* 
1.85 
(1.51) 
BQ 0.72 
(24.21)* 
0.89 
(12.09)* 
0.61 
(20.04)* 
0.91 
(9.13)* 
0.64 
(17.51)* 
2.38 
(2.55)** 
Trade   0.26 
(14.22)* 
-0.15 
(-2.08)** 
0.27 
(13.10)* 
-0.47 
(-1.40) 
SKILL     -0.00 
(-0.57) 
0.06 
(1.47) 
Instrumental 
Variables 
 Religion 
Mor 
 
 Religion 
Ethnic 
Trshare 
 Religion 
Ethnic 
Mor 
Trshare 
Adj. R2 0.31  0.38  0.40  
Obs. 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 
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TABLE 3: FDI regression considering Institution (Government Stability) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
GDP 0.38 
(80.34)* 
0.06 
(0.92) 
0.39 
(86.68)* 
0.45 
(5.91)* 
0.40 
(82.44)* 
0.39 
(5.05)* 
DIS -0.29 
(-14.67)* 
0.64 
(1.20) 
-0.31 
(-17.18)* 
-2.57 
(-2.70)* 
-0.31 
(-15.62)* 
-2.05 
(-2.81)* 
GS 0.16 
(14.49)* 
0.69 
(6.59)* 
0.12 
(10.74)* 
0.65 
(3.51)* 
0.15 
(12.60)* 
0.63 
(3.18)* 
Trade   0.33 
(16.66)* 
0.44 
(2.22)** 
0.33 
(15.45)* 
0.60 
(3.04)* 
SKILL     -0.00 
(-6.92)* 
0.00 
(0.48) 
Instrumental 
Variables 
 Religion 
Mortality
 
 Religion 
Mortality
Trshare 
 Religion 
Ethnic 
Mortality
Trshare 
Adj. R2 0.15  0.25  0.31  
Obs. 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 
 
 
TABLE 4: FDI regression considering Institution (Corruption) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
GDP 0.38 
(108.81)* 
0.43 
(8.97)* 
0.40 
(118.68)*
0.26 
(7.95)* 
0.40 
(81.18)* 
3.97 
(0.64) 
DIS -0.30 
(-16.18)* 
-1.08 
(-2.52)** 
-0.32 
(-18.22)* 
0.35 
(1.45) 
-0.33 
(-16.41)* 
-3.75 
(-0.52) 
COR 0.30 
(19.47)* 
0.56 
(8.65)* 
0.22 
(15.23)* 
0.57 
(8.89)* 
0.22 
(11.37)* 
-9.74 
(-0.56) 
Trade   0.30 
(15.49)* 
-0.20 
(-2.69)* 
0.32 
(14.04)* 
2.61 
(0.58) 
SKILL     -0.00 
(-1.67)*** 
-0.76 
(-0.58) 
Instrumental 
Variables 
 Religion 
Mor 
 
 Religion 
Mor 
Trshare 
 Religion 
Ethnic 
Mor 
Trshare 
Adj. R2 0.18  0.27  0.28  
Obs. 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: First Stage Regressions 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
LAW BQ GS COR TRADE 
GDP  0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.09 0.06 
 12   
(7.41)* (12.14)* (-0.50) (8.95)* (4.38)* 
DIS 0.00 
(0.13) 
0.00 
(0.45) 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
-0.00 
(-0.19) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
TRSHARE 0.41 
(7.91)* 
-0.05 
(-1.66)*** 
1.49 
(10.47)* 
0.14 
(2.56)** 
1.38 
(16.71)* 
MOR 0.05 
(0.47) 
-0.08 
(-1.14) 
2.30 
(9.19)* 
-0.43 
(-3.95) 
-1.25 
(-10.12)* 
RELIGION 4.55 
(26.73)* 
2.79 
(28.04)* 
6.98 
(15.23)* 
3.94 
(22.98) 
-0.68 
(-2.47)** 
Obs. 2420 2420 2420 2420 2420 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.46 0.18 0.49 0.33 
 
 
Note: GDP is the sum of the logs of the host country and source country Gross 
Domestic Products; DIS is the distance in kilometres between the capital cities of 
source and host countries; SKILL is a measure of skill labour abundance in the parent 
country relative to the host country;  is the ratio of sum of host country’s 
exports and imports to host country’s GDP. LAW represents law and order, BQ 
represents Bureaucratic Quality, GS represents Government Stability, COR represents 
corruption, Trshare is predicted trade share, Mor is mortality. Significance at 1 %, 5 
% and 10% are denoted by *, **, *** respectively.  
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